Трудная проблема сознания
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Книга посвящена обсуждению "трудной проблемы сознания" — вопроса о том, почему функционирование человеческого мозга сопровождается субъективным опытом. Рассматриваются истоки этой проблемы, впервые в четком виде сформулированной австралийским философом Д.Чалмерсом в начале 90-х гг. XX века. Анализируется ее отношение к проблеме сознание — тело и проблеме ментальной каузальности. На материале сочинений Дж. Серла, Д.Деннета, Д.Чалмерса и многих других аналитических философов критически оцениваются различные подходы к загадке сознания. В заключительной части книги автор предлагает собственное видение "трудной проблемы", позволяющее, с его точки зрения, избежать концептуальных тупиков и отдать должное интуициям здравого смысла
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