Управляя общим. Эволюция институций коллективного действия
Управляя общим. Эволюция институций коллективного действия читать книгу онлайн
В этой новаторской книге Элинор Остром берется за один из самых сложных и спорных вопросов позитивной политической экономии, а именно — как организовать использование совместных ресурсов так, чтобы избежать и чрезмерного потребления, и административных расходов. Если ресурсы используются многими лицами, то есть четко определенных индивидуальных имущественных прав на них нет, экономисты часто считают их пригодными для эксплуатации только тогда, когда проблему чрезмерного потребления решают или путем приватизации, или применяя внешнее принуждение. Остром же решительно утверждает, что есть и другие решения, и можно создать стабильные институции самоуправления, если решить проблемы обеспечения, доверия и контроля.
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